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Access to Environmental
Information 
In the February 2004 issue of EHP in the arti-
cle “Does Secrecy Equal Security? Limiting
Access to Environmental Information,”
Richard Dahl (2004) discussed the govern-
ment’s current policies placing greater restric-
tions on public access to information that
industry and government were once required
to make available. 
A future in which federal agencies with-
hold information on environmental prob-
lems throughout the United States economy
in the name of “national security” can be
glimpsed by taking a look at Department of
Energy (DOE) facilities. DOE facilities have
long operated at the nexus of public concern
and national security.
In the 10 years that I have devoted to
studying historical exposures at DOE sites,
I have seen the future, and it’s not pretty.
My experience with the DOE’s response to
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA 2004)
requests has been enlightening:
• In 1996, a DOE FOIA officer asserted that
records from a reactor safety committee at
Los Alamos National Laboratory were not
classified but possibly “sensitive.” I followed
up with a written request for a legal defini-
tion of “sensitive”; his response was that he
was unable to find a definition.
• After patiently waiting several months for a
response to another FOIA request, I finally
obtained reports on historical air emissions
of plutonium at Los Alamos, but pages
were missing in a regular sequence. When I
enquired about the missing pages, a DOE
FOIA officer told me that maybe the miss-
ing pages were “owned” by the contractor
and not by the federal government, and
therefore were beyond the reach of the
FOIA. 
• Also, colleagues holding security clearances
at DOE sites told me that they were some-
times afraid to discuss subjects that were
amply documented in the public domain. 
• Highly qualified academic epidemiologists
have had to struggle with government
lawyers in attempts to obtain access to histor-
ical exposure records (Advisory Committee
on Energy-Related Epidemiologic Research
1996). The lawyers had ample resources to
cause delays, but the epidemiologists had
limited time to complete work on National
Institutes of Health grants or face the oppro-
brium of peers and funding agencies.
Many former workers who have submit-
ted claims for illness compensation under the
Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Act (2000) face a difficult sit-
uation: they are depending upon timely
access to information about past exposures so
they can receive compensation before they
die (General Accounting Office 2004).
Further restrictions on information access
put in place by some DOE contractors since
11 September 2001 (Costner et al. 2002;
Widner et al. 2004) may have the effect of
alienating some of our most loyal citizens.
Much of the secrecy involving DOE
facilities during the Cold War was unneces-
sary, and it is deeply distressing that some
government officials who lead the current
“war on terrorism” seem not to have learned
this lesson.
Environmental health practice and sci-
ence suffer when information does not flow
freely. The environmental health commu-
nity has plenty of experience advocating
unpopular positions when we believe we are
right. We are well-positioned to lead society
in resisting the intrusion of national secu-
rity secrecy into democratic processes and
institutions.
The author declares he has no competing
financial interests.
Ken Silver
Department of Environmental Health
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, Tennessee
E-mail: silver@etsu.edu
REFERENCES
Advisory Committee on Energy-Related Epidemiologic
Research. 1996. Summary of the Eighth Meeting,
18–19 April 1996, Santa Fe, NM. Atlanta, GA: Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. 
Costner B, Rogers P. 2002. Access denied. Bull At Sci 58(2):58.
Dahl R. 2004. Does secrecy equal security? Limiting access to
environmental information. Environ Health Perspect
112:A104–A107.
Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act of
2000. 2000. Public Law 106-398.
FOIA (Freedom of Information Act). 2004. 5USC552.
General Accounting Office. 2004. Energy Employees
Compensation. Draft Report. GAO-04-516. Washington,
DC:General Accounting Office. 
Widner T, Shonka J, Flack S, O’Brien J, Burns R, Buddenbaum J,
et al. 2004. Draft Interim Report of the Los Alamos Historical
Document Retrieval and Assessment (LAHDRA) Project.
Alameda, CA:ENSR International. Available: http://
www.shonka.com/ReConstructionZone/pubs/
LAHDRA%20Draft%20Interim%20Report%20v1b-w.pdf
[accessed 5 May 2004]. 
Testing Toxic Compounds in
Human Subjects: Ethical
Standards and Good Science
We read with interest the letter by Sass and
Needleman (2004) and the responses it trig-
gered (Charnley and Patterson 2004; Chart
et al. 2004; McAllister 2004; Tobia et al.
2004). In our opinion, Sass and Needleman
made two main points: a) human studies with
low statistical power are not helpful in deter-
mining the presence and magnitude of
adverse effects from environmental toxicants;
and b) industry sponsorship may consciously
or unconsciously bias study design, data
analysis, or interpretation. We were thus sur-
prised by the focus of the respondents, which
was on issues of ethics in human research
per se. One of us (J.M.L.) co-chairs an insti-
tutional review board (IRB). In general, IRB
approval of a human research protocol hinges
on two major factors: a) the relationship
between risk and benefit, and b) the adequacy
of the informed consent process.
In relation to risks and benefits, virtu-
ally all research studies convey direct risk to
subjects. These risks fall into one of three
categories: physical (e.g., adverse health
effects from a study intervention), psycho-
logical (e.g., stress from uncomfortable
interview questions), and social (e.g., breach
of privacy). Benefits, on the other hand,
always accrue to society and only infre-
quently are directly conveyed to subjects.
Thus, direct risks to subjects must be bal-
anced by the potential benefits to society in
many protocols; this is certainly the case for
studies of environmental agents with inten-
tional exposures to subjects. One of the
major considerations of an IRB in deciding
whether or not the risk–benefit balance is
appropriate is the scientific design of the
study; studies with poor design or inadequate
statistical power cannot produce results of
benefit to society and thus inappropriately
expose subjects to risk. In this regard, the
ethical issue that Sass and Needleman (2004)
raise is not whether it is appropriate to inten-
tionally expose volunteers to environmental
toxicants per se, but whether it is appropriate
to do so in small numbers that do not have
adequate statistical power to answer the
question in a meaningful way.
Sass and Needleman (2004) also took
issue with the interpretation of the data in
two studies, and support their concerns by
citing work authored by one of us (Goldman
et al. 1990a, 1990b). Both studies reported
evidence that the pesticide aldicarb is toxic
to humans at levels much lower than those
predicted by a 1971 study of four Union
Carbide employees (Haines 1971) and
Rhone-Poulenc’s 1992 human dosing study
(Wyld et al. 1992). While the 1990 studies
(Goldman et al. 1990a, 1990b) have been
criticized because they did not use controlled
dosage levels, it is important that we use
information from outbreaks in order to test
our assumptions regarding the applicability
of limited premarket test data for regulatory
standard setting for the general population.
In this regard, protocols involving inten-
tional exposures to limited numbers of
human subjects often face a major challenge
beyond low statistical power: restriction of
volunteers to healthy male adults, who are
not representative of the general population,
especially its most vulnerable members. As a
result, the interpretation of results from such
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human dosing studies, especially if the toxi-
cant has a relatively high lowest observable
effects level, may be misleading in the con-
text of the general population.
In the context of Sass and Needleman’s
points (Sass and Needleman 2004), we pro-
pose that a) studies should only be approved
by the IRB if the results will have scientific
validity based on a priori considerations of
design, sample size, and statistical power; and
b) authors, reviewers, journal editors, and
ultimately readers strive to ensure that inter-
pretations of results conform to the data and
acknowledge limitations in extrapolation to
the general population.
One of the responses to Sass and
Needleman (2004) was a statement by a
representative of CropLife America, the
pesticide industry trade association. In that
statement, McAllister (2004) asserted that
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) put a moratorium on human testing
due to “an intense media campaign and
public pressure.” One of us (L.R.G.) was an
official at the U.S. EPA responsible for the
U.S. EPA’s pesticide program at the time
the first moratorium was adopted in 1998
(U.S. EPA 1998). While nearly all impor-
tant matters at the U.S. EPA are accompa-
nied by “an intense media campaign and
public pressure” (McAllister 2004), the rea-
son for the moratorium was that officials at
the U.S. EPA at that time were stunned to
find that the agency had not taken the nec-
essary steps to ensure that its actions to gen-
erate and utilize human data met the
standards for protection of human subjects.
In 1998, we assembled a panel of expert sci-
entists and ethicists to advise the U.S. EPA,
under the agency’s Science Advisory
Committee and Scientific Advisory Panel.
That committee concluded that human
testing to determine adverse effect levels was
not scientifically justified, but it could not
concur about other types of human experi-
mentation, and thus was not able to present
to the U.S. EPA a complete consensus on
the issue (U.S. EPA 2000).
McAllister (2004) and others are rightly
outraged that the U.S. EPA still has not taken
action to resolve this issue. However, we may
disagree about what actions are appropriate.
In his letter, McAllister (2004) asserted that
human testing of pesticides is “equivalent” to
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
phase I investigations of pharmaceuticals.
However, important ethical distinctions can
be made between the benefits of pharma-
ceuticals to both individuals and society
versus the benefits of pest control agents,
and there is at least potential benefit to sub-
jects in many clinical trials of new drugs.
Further, the U.S. EPA still does not have in
place any mechanism to safeguard the use
of human subjects in their approval process.
In contrast, in the case of phase I clinical
trials and other human studies, the FDA
does have such a mechanism. Specifically,
the FDA adopted regulations in 1980,
1981, and 1996 (FDA 2003a) that provide
enforceable requirements for informed con-
sent of human subjects in any studies that
are submitted to the FDA for regulatory
approval of products. Also, in 1981 and in
1991, the FDA adopted regulations requir-
ing IRB approval for such studies (FDA
2003b). These regulations are consistent with
the Common Rule cited by McAllister
(2004) but go well beyond it, as appropriate
given the financial interest of third parties.
Regulations do not assure compliance, but
the absence of safeguards at the U.S. EPA is a
dangerous situation that needs to be rectified.
This, indeed, is what recently was con-
cluded by the National Research Council
(NRC) in its report Use of Third Party
Toxicity Research with Human Research
Participants (NRC 2003). Among the
dozens of recommendations to the
U.S. EPA were a number of specific recom-
mendations regarding the scientific validity
of such studies. In recognition of the
increased potential for bias when there is
much at stake for study sponsors, the NRC
(2003) recommended that the U.S. EPA
put in place a number of safeguards to
assure that industry-sponsored studies per-
formed in support of regulatory standards
receive especially careful scrutiny. In many
respects, these recommendations go beyond
current practice at the FDA. The NRC
report (NRC 2003) provided a blueprint
for action—actions that need to be taken as
soon as possible to dispel the uncertainties
that have been created by administrative
policies and court cases revolving around
these issues. Whether studies such as those
critiqued by Sass and Needleman (2004)
would have been allowed under the stricter
standards recommended by the NRC
(2003) is a matter of debate, but we doubt
it. Of greatest importance in our view, the
U.S. EPA needs to adopt all of the reforms
recommended by the NRC (2003) in order
to assure, to the extent possible, that both
their own research and the research they
incorporate into regulations meets the
highest ethical standards.
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Testing Toxic Pesticides in
Humans: Health Risks with No
Health Benefits
Sass and Needleman (2004a) described cir-
cumstances under which industry-sponsored
studies on erythrocyte cholinesterase inhibi-
tion by the pesticides dichlorvos and aldicarb
showed significant adverse effects that were
dismissed by the industry-sponsored authors.
Sass and Needleman (2004a) also cautioned
about the very limited value of human studies
that are based on an examination of short-
term pesticide-induced effects in a small
number of healthy adults. In the same issue
of EHP, several rebuttal letters from industry
were published (Charnley and Patterson
2004; Chart et al. 2004; McAllister 2004;
Tobia et al. 2004) advocating the value and
need for conducting studies of toxic agents in
human subjects. 
Why would the chemical and pesticide
industries want to conduct studies of toxicCorrespondence
chemicals and carcinogens in humans? The
likely answer to this question lies in the way
regulatory agencies, such as the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
establish allowable human exposure levels
to toxic chemicals. For most agents, human
exposure standards are based on toxicology
findings from studies in animals. As a pub-
lic health protective measure, uncertainty
factors (for example, 10-fold for differences
in human versus animal sensitivity to that
agent) are typically applied to the no
observed effect level (NOEL) or the lowest
observed effect level (LOEL) in animals to
set maximum allowable human exposures
to these toxic agents. However, if, in the
opinion of the regulated industry, data from
exposed humans suggest that this factor
may be too high, then they pressure the
U.S. EPA to use a lower factor, or even no
adjustment, for the animal-to-human
extrapolation. If the industry wins their
argument, then the general public will
encounter much higher levels of these toxic
agents in the air we breathe, the water we
drink, the food we eat, and the places we
work. A fundamental question in the
debate on how to estimate risk and apply
uncertainty factors to assure human safety
is, when dealing with uncertainty, is it more
important to be public health protective by
minimizing human exposures to known
toxic agents or is it more important to pro-
tect the profits of those who release toxic
materials into our environment? 
McAllister (2004), representing the pes-
ticide industry trade group, equated studies
of pesticides in humans to clinical trials of
potential pharmaceutical agents. However,
there is a major difference in the objectives
of these types of studies. After extensive ani-
mal experiments, clinical trials are conducted
to determine the efficacy of experimental
drugs to slow or reverse a disease or predis-
ease condition without inducing significant
adverse or life-threatening side effects. In
contrast, the motive for testing toxic pesti-
cides in humans is to influence regulations
that limit our exposure to known toxic and
carcinogenic agents. The Implementation
Working Group, a coalition of pesticide
manufacturers, farm group, and food proces-
sors, acknowledged that the strategy for
human experiments is to “avoid the need for
the 10-fold UF [uncertainty factor] for
interspecies extrapolation” (Environmental
Working Group 1998). Pesticide residues in
foods have no known health benefits, and
the studies of toxic pesticides in humans are
not performed to reveal any health gains.
Although we disagree with human testing, it
is critically important that such studies, if
they are to be conducted, must provide suf-
ficient and reliable measures of human risk
and that information is properly used in
making policy decisions that affect the
health of the general public. Reliable
extrapolation factors are necessary to protect
the public from unnecessary exposures to
known hazardous chemicals. 
A first consideration is that the bio-
marker measured in these studies is the most
sensitive and reliable end point for estimat-
ing human risk. For example, dichlorvos,
discussed by Sass and Needleman (2004a), is
carcinogenic at multiple sites in rats and
mice (Chan et al. 1991), and it induces gene
mutations and chromosomal damage in
mammalian cells. Carcinogenic risks of
dichlorvos are not revealed by measurements
of red blood cell acetylcholinesterase (AChE)
inhibition. Also, Sass and Needleman
(2004b) noted that measurement of erythro-
cyte AChE activity in healthy adults is a
poor surrogate of neurologic effects that can
result from low-dose exposure to pesticides
during critical states in fetal and neonatal
develoment. 
Second, the duration of exposure is
important because effects that require long-
term or chronic exposure will not be
revealed in a single-dose or 3-week study.
Human studies must capture the time- and
dose-dependent responses that may occur in
larger populations that are chronically
exposed. 
Third, inhibition of AChE by organo-
phosphorous pesticides can occur at very
low concentrations. The ability to detect a
significant change in exposed humans is a
function of the doses used, timing of evalua-
tion, group size, and interindividual variabil-
ity in factors affecting the pharmacokinetics
and pharmacodynamics of the pesticide.
Thus, group size must be sufficiently large
to detect low-dose effects and to distinguish
a LOEL from a true NOEL. Because testing
of toxic pesticides in humans has been lim-
ited to healthy adults, these data do not
inform us of variability due to exposures
during different life stages or individual dif-
ferences in health status, genetics, or coexpo-
sure to other agents that act on the same
target or affect different steps in the multi-
step processes leading to disease. For this
reason, we recommend that any decisions
made with these data be based on a pre-
dicted NOEL for 99% of the healthy adult
population and not on calculated mean val-
ues. Relevant to the methods by which the
U.S. EPA and other regulatory agencies
identify an adverse NOEL concerns how
these agencies address interindividual differ-
ences in susceptibility due to extrinsic and
intrinsic factors, such as those listed above.
Tests conducted in healthy adults are not
predictive of effects that can occur in the
fetuses, children, adolescents, pregnant
women, the elderly, and the frail. In a recent
study Whyatt et al. (2004) have shown that
prenatal exposures to organophosphate pes-
ticides (chlorpyrifos and diazinon) from resi-
dential use resulted in measurable levels of
these insecticides in umbilical cord plasma
that were associated with impaired fetal
growth. Because a safety factor of 10-fold
does not adequately account for the wide
range of susceptibility that exists in human
populations, there is a need to reexamine the
adequacy of this uncertainty factor to pro-
vide adequate health protection. 
If studies in humans do not adequately
inform of the likelihood of time-dependent,
dose-related effects in humans, then it is
truly unethical to intentionally expose
human volunteers to such poisons and car-
cinogens. Further, if pesticide-exposure
studies in humans are deemed essential and
necessary, then it is important that volun-
teers in these studies be duly informed that
short-term and particularly long-term
health risks from participation in these
studies are not known. 
Sass and Needleman (2004a) raised valid
concerns of potentially misleading conclu-
sions being drawn from studies of toxic pes-
ticides in small numbers of healthy adults.
For some reason, and counter to the com-
mon practice of EHP, the journal published
rebuttal letters promoting the industry per-
spective in the same issue. These letters
claimed that the industry-sponsored pesti-
cide studies in humans were conducted in
accordance with ethical standards at the
time and principles of good laboratory prac-
tice. However, good laboratory practice does
not compensate for an inadequate experi-
mental design. We agree with Sass and
Needleman (2004a) and with the U.S. EPA
Science Advisory Board and the FIFRA
(Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act) Scientific Advisory Panel
(U.S. EPA 2000), who concluded that justi-
fication for the human subjects in pesticide
testing “cannot be to facilitate the interests
of industry or of agriculture, but only to bet-
ter safeguard the public health.” It is wrong
to intentionally dose people with toxic pesti-
cides for the purpose of lobbying the
U.S. EPA to lower interspecies extrapolation
factors.
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Toxicity of Fragrances
I appreciated Barb Wilkie’s (2004) impor-
tant letter on the need to do more research
on health effects of artificial fragrance and
flavor products. Over 4,000 chemicals are
used in artificial fragrance products, yet the
vast majority of products have never been
tested for human toxicity (Ashford and
Miller 1991). Several studies have found that
low to moderate exposures of artificial fra-
grances can significantly worsen asthma in a
large percentage of asthmatics (Kumar et al.
1995; Millqvist and Lowhagen 1996; Shim
and Williams 1986). Fragrances have long
contained several neurotoxic compounds
such as musk ambrette (Spencer et al. 1984).
Mice exposed to moderate airborne levels of
fragrances experienced significant behavioral
changes (Anderson and Anderson 1998). I
hope that EHP can publish some research on
health effects of fragrances in future issues. 
financial interests.
Luke Curtis 
University of Illinois at Chicago
School of Public Health
Wilmette, Illinois 
REFERENCES
Anderson R, Anderson J. 1998. Acute toxic effects of fragrance
products. Arch Environ Health 53(2):138–146.
Ashford N, Miller C. 1991. Chemical Exposures: Low Levels
and High Stakes. New York:Von Nostrand Reinold.
Kumar P, Caradonna-Graham VM, Gupta S, Cai X, Rao PN,
Thompson J. Inhalation challenge effects of perfume
scent strips in patients with asthma. 1995. Annals Allergy
75(5):429–433.
Millqvist E, Lowhagen O. 1996. Placebo controlled challenges
with perfume in patients with asthma-like symptoms.
Allergy 51(6):434–439.
Shim C, Williams MH. 1986. Effect of odors in asthma. Am J
Med 80(1):18–22.
Spencer PS, Bischoff-Fenton MC, Moreno OM, Opdyke DL,
Ford RA. 1984. Neurotoxic properties of musk ambrette.
Toxicol Appl Pharmacol 75(3):571–575.
Wilkie B. 2004.Grand Rounds in Environmental Mmedicine: infor-
mation on MCS needed. Environ Health Perspect 112:A266.
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 112 | NUMBER 8 | June 2004 A 461
Global
Nitrogen
Cycle
➤ Health Effects of 
Nanoparticles
➤ Breastfeeding and Infant 
Mortality
➤ Hydrogen Research
Initiative
Next Month
I
m
a
g
e
 
V
a
u
l
t
E-mail: LukeTCurtis@aol.com
The author declares he has no competing